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ABSTRACT 
The use of packet filters has increased considerably due to the 
growth of Internet users and network services. A number of header 
fields must be examined by the filter, causing delay for each packet 
processed. The problem is compounded when considering multiple 
filters across a network. To maximize network performance, it 
would be desirable to minimize the number of packet filters for 
each path across a domain. Due to the interactions of rules between 
filters, the underlying network topology and the actions of dynamic 
routing protocols, it is computationally infeasible to implement this 
strategy by collectively considering all packet filters across the 
network. A simpler approach is the elimination of a filter by 
merging two filters on a common network segment. This work 
presents a novel packet filter merging algorithm using decision 
diagrams. A large number of practical and simulated experimental 
results are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
technique and possible enhancements are considered in the 
conclusion. The results show an average 20% performance 
improvement can be obtained using the technique.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Packet filters are typically referred to as Access Control Lists 
(ACLs) and are an important tool for specifying inter-domain or 
intra-domain access control. They are also commonly used to select 
traffic for policy routing, Quality of Service and Network Address 
Translation. ACLs compare address fields in the Layer 3 and 4 
headers of a packet and use this information to determine if a packet 
should be dropped or further processed by subsequent routers. 
ACLs are represented as an ordered list of rules, which typically 
examine 5 header fields in a packet: source and destination IP 
addresses, source and destination port numbers and protocol type. 
The first matching rule defines the action to take on a packet. 
Formally, an ACL defines a mapping between any possible packet 
and the decision to be taken on it, which can be permit or deny. 
ACLs can be deployed at the edge of a domain, in this capacity they 
act as packet filtering firewalls to prevent untrusted traffic from 
entering a network and control the traffic that is permitted to leave 
a network.  
Another common use of ACLs is for controlling access between 
different parts of a domain. The security policy for an organization 
may dictate that a particular network or service should not be 
accessible to another. ACLs can be configured for many types of 
network devices, such as routers, switches, hosts and dedicated 
firewall units. 
Packet filtering performance has come under increasing scrutiny 
from the research community in recent years. In the early days of 
the Internet, networks and the number of running services were 
relatively small in comparison with today’s modern networks. Link 
speeds for Local and Wide Area networks were also much lower 
and this was considered the dominant factor contributing to packet 
delay. As link speeds have increased, the delay associated with 
packet processing in routers has become more significant and 
received greater attention. The amount of delay will depend on a 
number of factors, including the hardware platform, underlying 
software implementation and the number of fields which must be 
examined. The number of networks and services has increased 
dramatically in recent years. This increase has led to the use of 
larger ACLs to control access to these networks and services.  
The cumulative delay for a packet will increase considerably each 
time a packet is required to be checked against an ACL. It would 
be desirable to improve network performance by reducing the 
number of times a packet must be checked from source to 
destination. Any optimization would need to ensure that the 
network security policy is not compromised. 
 
Figure 1. Packet delay subject to ACLs of increasing size. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Improving filtering performance 
The majority of previous work is concerned with improving packet 
filtering performance using a variety of different methods. Linear 
search remains the most space efficient form of packet filtering and 
several schemes have strived to improve performance by rule 
reordering and removing redundant rules. When using alternative 
data structures, a compromise must be made between filtering 
performance and the space required to store the classifier. A packet 
classifier for security filtering will typically use 5 fields: protocol 
number, source IP address, destination IP address, source port 
number and a destination port number. The total number of possible 
packets from these fields is the Cartesian product of the number of 
bits for each field = 28*232*232*216*216 =2104 possible packets; it 
would be computationally infeasible to represent each packet as a 
single bit in an array or hash table. 
2.2 Geometric representations 
Packet classification can be represented geometrically. Filtering on 
a single field is equivalent to finding the highest priority interval on 
a number line (0-255 for protocol, 0-232 for an IPv4 address and 0-
65535 for a port number). Filters which use two fields form 
rectangles which enclose the set of packets which will match the 
filter. Each rectangle has a priority based on its position in the list. 
Formally, two-dimensional filtering is equivalent to finding a point 
which falls on the highest priority axes-parallel rectangle. This 
concept can be generalized to higher dimensions for filters which 
examine 3 or more packet fields. For a filter with d fields, a rule is 
a d-dimensional hyperrectangle in d-dimensional space with a 
priority based on its position in the original list [1]. The address 
fields of a packet can be considered a single point in geometric 
space as each address in the packet header is a single, discrete 
value. 
 
Figure 2. A Firewall Decision Diagram (FDD) [28]. 
3. RELATED WORK 
3.1 Firewall verification and reduction 
Most verification techniques use a form of decision diagram such 
as binary decision diagrams (BDDs), Interval Decision Diagrams 
(IDDs) or firewall decision diagrams (FDDs). Binary decision 
diagrams are data structures used to represent Boolean functions [2] 
and have been used to represent packet filters, first demonstrated 
by Hazelhurst [3] [4]. One of the limitations of BDD representation 
is their use of individual bits to represent rules. This is effective 
using FPGAs but less so on generic CPUs due to the overhead 
associated with extracting individual bits from a 32 or 64-bit word 
[5]. 
An off-line anomaly detection tool was developed in [6] by 
statically analyzing packet filters represented by BDDs. SAT-
solvers have been used to test for anomalies in firewalls policies 
[7]. A method to measure and quantify firewall policies using 
BDDs was presented in [8]. A number of metrics were defined to 
quantify firewall security, management and performance. These 
included complexity of the rule set, average comparisons per rule 
and number of unused rules. A firewall verification algorithm 
requiring O(nd) (n = number of rules, d = number of dimensions) 
space complexity is provided in [9]. This approach requires probe 
packets to test reachability. An equivalence relationship between 
verification and redundancy protection is defined in [10]. Further 
anomalies which may exist for rules that filter on TCP connection 
flags were identified in [11] and off-line tool was produced to detect 
and eliminate such conflicts. 
3.2 Rule reduction techniques 
It is desirable to minimize the number of rules required to represent 
a security policy. The two primary reasons for this are improving 
filtering performance and reducing the amount of memory required 
to store the filter. List reduction is also important when considering 
hardware classification using Ternary Content Addressable 
Memory (TCAM) due to their limited capacity. 
Yoon et al. proposed a novel method for ACL reduction using an 
algorithm called substitutional optimization [12]. Its purpose is to 
reduce the size of a rule set by substituting a group of rules with 
specific properties for a smaller group. The authors provide a 
simple example showing a reduced rule set. It is unclear if these 
specific conditions occur commonly in real-life classifiers. 
TCAM Razor is a series of algorithms developed to minimize the 
number of entries required to represent a rule set in a TCAM [13]. 
The scheme obtains the smallest number of prefixes required to 
represent a single field using dynamic programming techniques. 
Results show that it provides a significant reduction in the number 
of rules. Other TCAM compression schemes use alternate forms of 
prefix encoding to reduce the number of prefix rules generated [14] 
[15] however these suffer from additional overhead for packet 
lookups. 
Bit weaving is a technique which exploits the use of ternary masks 
in TCAMs [16]. This is achieved by bit merging and swapping 
techniques to reduce the number of entries. The overall 
compression achieved by this technique will vary depending on the 
structure of the original classifier; however, it is possible to use bit 
weaving with other list reduction techniques to further reduce the 
number of rules. 
The firewall compressor framework uses integer intervals instead 
of prefixes to represent the rule set. This problem is reformulated 
as a scheduling problem where each single field rule is a task and 
the goal is to obtain a schedule with the minimum number of tasks 
[17]. This technique was previously used by Suri to compress the 
number of entries in a routing table [18]. This approach is less 
suited to prefix-based rules. 
Liu, et al. combined the techniques used in TCAM Razor and 
firewall compressor. This allows the compression to be customized 
to the constraints of the software representation [19]. If a prefix rule 
is required, then the prefix minimization algorithm is used; if range 
rule is required, then the optimal scheduling algorithm is used 
instead [19]. 
An early attempt at rule compression using geometric techniques is 
provided by Applegate et al. [20]. The problem is mapped to the 
rectilinear picture compression problem found in graphics software 
applications. The goal is to find the shortest list of rules required to 
generate a given pattern on a canvas where black and white 
represent permit and deny respectively [20]. The authors consider 
the special case in which all rules must be defined as strips which 
span the entire canvas horizontally or vertically. A formal proof of 
NP hardness and an approximation algorithm is given for the 2-
dimensional form of the problem. The paper assumes that ACLs are 
usually specified using 2 fields which is insufficient for security 
filtering. 
Daly et al provide a framework for ACL range compression [21]. 
The ruleset is converted into a series of hyperplanes. Differences 
between adjacent planes are resolved by adding resolving rules 
followed by a merging of the planes. The process is repeated until 
all the planes are merged and then the entire process is repeated 
recursively until a 1-dimensional pattern remains which can be 
solved by using existing optimal algorithms. Results obtained from 
this technique show that it consistently outperforms the earlier 
firewall compressor algorithms by up to 30% for larger rulesets 
[21]. 
3.3 Optimizing Distributed Packet filters 
The use of distributed ACLs or firewalls in a network can lead to 
suboptimal configuration. It is possible some of the rules 
configured across multiple routers may be redundant due to rules 
defined on another router in the network. In an extreme case, a large 
proportion of the rules may be redundant. Another possible cause 
of rule redundancy is due to the traffic being processed by the 
router. If a router has no route to a destination network, then any 
rule with the same destination address field will be redundant. 
Detecting this form of redundancy requires knowledge of the 
routing data and topology of the domain.  
The first attempt to identify and remove inter-firewall redundant 
rules is given by Al-Shaer, et al [22]. The conditions which cause 
intra-firewall and inter-firewall anomalies are defined and 
discussed. An inter-firewall anomaly is present when individual 
firewalls along the same path perform different filtering actions on 
the same traffic [22]. Yuan, et al. developed a method for detecting 
and removing redundant rules across distributed firewalls using 
Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) and static analysis techniques 
[6]. The distributed firewalls are represented as a tree structure and 
set intersection and union operations are performed using BDDs 
[6]. Chen et al considers the problem of identifying redundant rules 
between 2 firewalls belonging to different administrative domains 
[23]. It is assumed that each domain cannot disclose its security 
policy to the other. The work identifies redundant rules that can be 
removed on a firewall due to the upstream firewall in the 
neighboring domain. 
 
Figure 3. (a) and (b) FDD construction (c) pruning of permit 
space. 
4. MEASURING FILTER DELAY 
A number of independent tests were performed to evaluate the 
performance of trie-based ACLs using low end routers. Using a 
trie-based filtering technique, the packet delay is independent of the 
number of rules in the ACL. Due to the difficulty in obtaining large, 
real rulesets, synthetic ACLs were generated using a custom-built 
generation tool. The experiments were carried out using a Cisco 
2600 router with 32mb RAM and advanced enterprise IOS installed 
which uses trie-based filtering. The results show that even a low-
end router is capable of storing in excess of 50,000 rules. This 
provides the motivation for developing a list merging technique to 
reduce delay over a pair of routers by eliminating one of the filters. 
Wireshark was used to obtain a timestamp of the packet before and 
after ACL processing. Fig. 1 shows the packet delay for ACLs from 
1000-50000 rules. The filtering delay remains constant due to the 
use of binary tries in the filtering process. 
 
Figure 4. Pseudocode for FDD pruning algorithm. 
4.1 Firewall Decision Diagrams 
A Firewall Decision Diagram (FDD, Fig. 2) is a decision tree used 
for firewall verification by storing integer intervals at its edges. For 
any outgoing edge from a non-leaf node in the FDD, the integer 
intervals are completely disjoint [24]. The depth of the tree is d 
dimensions; this is usually bounded at 5 for a typical packet filter. 
Each leaf node of the FDD stores a decision: accept or discard. A 
packet will only match a single path from the root node to a leaf 
decision node [24]. The FDD represents the semantics of a packet 
filter [24]. Liu [25] provides algorithms to reduce the tree and 
generate rules from it. 
4.2 A theoretical algorithm for removing 
ACLs 
The merging of two separate ACLs into a single, semantically 
equivalent list requires that the exact set of packets which will be 
permitted or denied is known for both ACLs. Firewall Decision 
Diagrams are the most efficient method for representing the 
semantics of a filter. In the paper, firstly an FDD is constructed 
which represents the firewall, reduced and marked to reduce the 
number of generated rules. Finally, the rules are generated by 
performing a depth-first traversal of the FDD and removing any 
redundant rules.  
In [25] a single ACL is translated to a FDD and then rules are 
generated from it. In this work, the first two steps are carried out, 
however this is followed by a pruning stage to remove all permit 
space (Fig. 3). Next, the second ACL is processed and appended to 
the partial FDD using the same construction and reduction 
algorithms. The remaining algorithms from the original work are 
FDD pruning algorithm
1: Initialise edgeStack, lastNodes 
2: while accept node incoming edge list is not empty 
3: add the acceptNode.IncomingEdges[0].SourceNode to lastNodes 
4: edge to remove = acceptNode.IncomingEdges[0] 
5: if edge to remove ∈ acceptNode.IncomingEdges[0].SourceNode.OutgoingEdges 
6:  remove edge to remove from 
acceptNode.IncomingEdges[0].SourceNode.OutgoingEdges 
7: remove first edge from acceptNode.IncomingEdges 
8: clear source, destination and label pointers of edge to remove 
9: for each node in lastNodes 
10: if node has no outgoing edges 
11:  push all incoming edges of node onto edgeStack 
12: while edgeStack is not empty 
13: topEdge = pop first edge from edgeStack 
14: remove topEdge pointer from topEdge source node outgoing edges 
15: remove topEdge pointer from topEdge destination node incoming edges 
16: if topEdge destination node has 1 incoming edge 
17:  remove topEdge destination node from nodelist 
18:  deallocate all memory associated with topEdge destination node 
19: delete topEdge pointer 
20: if topEdge source node has no outgoing edges 
21:  push all incoming edges of topEdge source node onto edgeStack 
used to generate and compress the rules from the FDD. 
Additionally, a rule redundancy removal algorithm [26] is used to 
reduce the size of the ruleset after merging is complete. This is an 
essential step in the merging process as it is likely that many of the 
merged rules are redundant following a merge operation. 
The construction algorithm builds the FDD using the packet header 
fields in each rule and the intersection relations between them. 
After construction, the FDD is reduced to minimize the number of 
outgoing edges at each outgoing node of the tree. This helps reduce 
memory consumption and the number of rules generated from the 
tree. The marking algorithm is used to identify tree edges which 
contain the largest number of intervals and wildcard them to further 
reduce the number of rules. A generation algorithm generates the 
rules from the FDD by traversing the fields at each edge of the tree 
from the root to leaf nodes. The compaction algorithm can detect 
and remove some redundant rules in the list. Lastly, the 
simplification algorithm simplifies rules which comprise of disjoint 
intervals for a single field, as these are not permitted by packet filter 
frameworks such as IPTables or Cisco ACLs. 
4.3 A practical approach to list reduction 
It is not possible to simply append the second list to the end of the 
first due to completeness property of an ACL. It is possible, to 
append the second list, without modification if and only if the first 
list contains rules from the deny packet space of the original first 
ACL. It is straightforward to prove this method will work for any 
combination of rules. A packet d which should be denied by the 
first ACL must match one of the rules from the deny packet space. 
Conversely, a packet p which should be permitted will never be 
matched by one of these rules. The first matching rule of p must be 
a rule in the second list as a result. This technique will work if and 
only if the set of deny rules exactly match the set of packets to be 
denied in the original ACL. 
 
Figure 5. Merge sizes for remaining tests with real extended 
ACLs. 
4.4 FDD Pruning 
After the FDD is constructed from the first ACL, it is necessary to 
prune all paths which lead to an accept node. It is important to 
ensure that nodes with outgoing edges which do not belong to a 
path which leads to a discard node are also deleted. The resulting 
algorithm must also ensure that all discard paths from the original 
reduced FDD remain. The partial FDD remaining after the pruning 
stage is equivalent to the set of packets discarded by the first ACL. 
The algorithm performs a depth-first search starting from the 
terminal accept node. During the search, the edges and nodes 
leading to the accept node are removed from the FDD. The 
pseudocode is shown in Fig. 4. A stack is used to store the edges to 
be traversed during the search. A vector of node pointers is used to 
store the source nodes associated with the traversed edges. Lines 4-
8: The first incoming edge of the accept node is examined and its 
source node is placed in the last nodes vector. After all incoming 
edges have been evaluated; all incoming edges of the nodes stored 
in the lastNodes vector are added to the stack to continue the search. 
Lines 12-21: While the stack still has edges to process, an edge is 
removed from the top of the stack and its pointer is removed from 
its source and destination nodes (lines 14-15). If the destination 
node of the edge only has a single incoming edge, then the node 
can be safely deleted as it cannot be part of a discard path. Firstly, 
the node is removed from the node list and its memory is de-
allocated (lines 17-18). The process repeats until the stack becomes 
empty. After the pruning process is complete, the append algorithm 
is used again to append the second list to the pruned FDD. The 
resulting FDD represents the combined filtering action of the two 
ACLs. 
The algorithm can be used by a router to merge two ACLs on a 
common link into a single ACL placed on the egress port of the 
most upstream router. The merge algorithm can be implemented in 
the operating system of each router and run every time an ACL 
configuration change takes place. 
 
Figure 6. Merged rule sizes for 100 rules each in the inbound 
direction. 
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Testing was performed to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
techniques used. The testing was carried out using both real ACLs 
sourced from a service provider and synthetic ACLs generated 
using an established model. 
5.1 Tests using real ACLs 
A small number of real Cisco ACLs were obtained from a service 
provider network ranging from a few to ~200 rules. Some only 
filter on the source IP address, however, most used multiple fields. 
The ACLs were tested against each other to generate merged lists. 
For some tests, there was no intersection between the set of 
permitted packets for either filter. This may be due to the original 
ACLs filtering on traffic from a different customer of the service 
provider. The time taken to perform the merge and the average size 
of the merged lists is recorded for comparison with the original 
lists. This process is repeated for each pair of ACLs in the set. 
5.2 Tests using synthetic ACLs 
Synthetic rule sets were used to provide further evaluation of the 
merge algorithm. To provide more realistic results, a typical 
approach is to implement a model based on the statistics gathered 
from a large pool of real rules. The Perimeter rules model [27] 
produces random, non-uniform rule bases used for evaluating the 
performance of FDDs and similar data structures [27] [19]. The 
statistics used by the model are based on a total of 8500 rules 
acquired by the authors from various service providers. 
Average results are used for analysis of each test set of ACLs. As 
expected, the average results show an increase in the number of 
rules as the size of the original lists increases (Fig. 5) the average 
size of the merged list stays relatively small up to 500 rules per 
original list. There was a markedly greater increase in the number 
of rules for the set of tests using 1000 rules and a similar increase 
for 2000 rules. The average packet delay (Fig. 6) increased slightly 
as the number of rules increased, which contradicts some of the 
earlier results which show little variation in delay for any number 
of rules. The number of rules generated was highly dependent on 
the degree of overlap between the original rules. Fig. 7 shows a 
large variation in the sizes of the merged list in comparison with 
the original. Generally, the time taken to perform the merge 
operation increase linearly with the number of rules (Fig. 8). The 
variation is again due to the difference in overlap between the 
rulesets. 
 
Figure 7. Packet delay for tests using real ACLs. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This work examined issue of packet latency due to filtering. 
Software-based packet filters use tries, a form of decision tree 
which stores a bit-based representation of a packet field at each 
edge of the tree. It was found that it is theoretically possible to 
merge two packet filters by firstly converting one of filters to a set 
of rules which represents the set of packets denied by the filter. The 
second filter can be appended to the first without modification as 
only packets permitted by the first filter will be processed by the 
second. A data structure used in firewall verification, the Firewall 
Decision Diagram (FDD), was used to convert a filter into its 
semantic equivalent. All possible permit rules are removed from 
the FDD which results in a list of rules representing the denied 
packets. Subsequently, the second filter is added by appending it to 
the FDD using the same construction algorithm. The resulting FDD 
represents a list which is semantically equivalent to the original pair 
of lists. An extensive set of test results was generated to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the technique for reducing packet 
latency. The results show an average 20% performance 
improvement can be obtained using the technique. 
Prefix fields use a different algorithm to provide an optimal number 
of prefixes for a single dimension using dynamic programming. For 
future work, it would be desirable to incorporate these algorithms 
into the framework and evaluate their effectiveness in comparison 
with the marking algorithm. Additionally, the complex 
substitutional optimization algorithm proposed by Yoon et al is also 
directly applicable to FDDs. It would be interesting to test the 
effectiveness of the technique using real world filters. Future work 
may also involve exploring other possibilities for merging filters, 
including grouping rules by mask sharing. 
 
Figure 8. Scatter graph for merge time against number of 
generated rules 
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